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The debate between economic and political explanations of the adoption of proportional representation (PR) has
yielded mixed results. We reexamine this debate and argue that one has to take the different levels on which the
causal mechanisms are located into account. This leads to a novel reformulation of Rokkan’s hypotheses: we claim
that PR is introduced when legislators face strong district-level competition and when their parties expect to gain
seats from a change of the electoral law. In the empirical part, we model legislators’ support for the PR adoption
and evaluate the relative importance of district-level competition and vulnerability resulting from electoral inroads
made by Social Democratic candidates; partisan calculations arising from disproportionalities in the allocation of
votes to seats; and economic conditions at the district-level, specifically variation in skill profiles. Support for the
adoption of PR is explained by a combination of district vulnerabilities and seat-vote disproportionality.
T
he study of the process of reform of electoral
institutions during the first decades of the
twentieth century and the adoption of pro-
portional representation (PR) by some countries has
been at the center of comparative research in recent
years (Ahmed 2012; Benoit 2004; Blais, Dobrzynska
and Indridason 2005; Boix 1999; Calvo 2009; Colomer
2005; Cusack, Iversen and Soskice 2007, 2010; Kreuzer
2010).1 This renewed interest in the origin of these
political choices has been partly motivated by a related
literature examining the importance of proportional
representation in affecting a range of political
outcomes, including the level of government expendi-
tures, the types of social-spending programs, levels of
inequality, and so on. While these studies have advanced
a wide range of competing hypotheses about the eco-
nomic and political determinants of these electoral
reforms, the empirical tests formulated to adjudicate
among these competing explanations remain inade-
quate. This empirical deficit arises because the core
theoretical concepts of the literature have been either
measured at a level of aggregation that is, we believe,
uninformative or not measured at all.
Like any change in electoral rules, the adoption
of proportional representation poses an immediate
puzzle: why do politicians engage in risk-taking
behavior and decide to replace the institutional rules
on the basis of which they have been elected? Existing
explanations for the reform of electoral institutions
and the adoption of proportional representation cluster
in two broad explanatory families, stressing either eco-
nomic transformations or changes in the broader
political environment as the source of political anxiety
among right-wing politicians. Let us consider the
larger political changes first.
Both hypotheses—stressing either the rise of Social
Democracy or disproportionality in the allocation of
votes to seats—as determinants for demand for changes
in electoral institutions can be traced back to the work
of Braunias and Rokkan (Braunias 1932; see also
Rokkan 1970, 157–58). Contemporary studies seeking
to explain the adoption of proportional representation
have tested one of the two Rokkanian hypotheses. Boix
(1999) has provided a cross-national test of the first
Rokkanian hypothesis. In recent years, Calvo (2009)
has revived this second Rokkanian explanation and has
provided simulations informed by comparative cases to
illustrate this logic.
In Rokkan’s original study, the two political
hypotheses acted as substitutes. Rokkan conjectured
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that in some countries—such as Germany, Norway, or
Sweden—the socialist mobilization played a significant
role in accounting for the adoption of proportional
representation, while in other countries—such as
Belgium, Denmark, or Switzerland—considerations
about the disproportionality of the translation of seats
to votes were the primary factor in accounting for the
motivation of politicians to adopt changes in electoral
institutions (Rokkan, 1970, 157). In this article we
argue, however, that the two political hypotheses are
complements, rather than substitutes. Both explana-
tions can operate within the same case, but capture
constraints on the activity of legislators that operate at
different levels. The first political explanation locates
the salient constraint at the level of the electoral district,
in district-specific electoral vulnerabilities encountered
by candidates on the political right that face Social
Democratic challengers. By contrast, the second
Rokkanian explanation locates the salient constraint
at the level of the party. An important task for the
analysis is to identify the relative importance of
district-specific vulnerabilities and partisan variables
in affecting the preferences of legislators for changes
in the design of electoral institutions.
The alternative economic perspective has been
articulated by Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007).2
According to this approach, ‘‘the choice of electoral
systems is endogenous to the structure of economic
interests’’ (388). The key structural economic conditions
that are hypothesized to generate differences in polit-
ical preferences and variation in political outcomes
(adoption versus nonadoption of proportional
representation) are the presence of ‘‘co-specific assets,’’
in other words, investments in human capital
that are jointly made by employers and workers
(Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007). Cusack and his
colleagues hypothesize that in economies characterized
by ‘‘consensual labor relations’’ and high levels of
‘‘co-specific’’ assets, economic actors consider major-
itarian electoral rules as potentially detrimental to their
long-term economic interests. First-past-the-post
electoral systems allow groups with a narrow geographic
base to capture political power and enact legislation that
could potentially harm actors that had made long-term
economic investments. In the presence of significant
investments in skills, Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice
predict that the most significant interest groups and
the political parties to which they are tied will demand
the adoption of proportional representation. By con-
trast, majoritarian institutions persist in economies with
lower levels of co-specific assets. In contrast to the first
family of explanations, economic hypotheses about the
adoption of proportional representation derive their
political predictions about the demand for changes in
electoral institutions from the distribution of economic
endowments and less from partisan or electoral
considerations.
All explanations, political or economic in nature,
are framed at a theoretical level that is quite abstract.
Ultimately, they seek to explain choices made by in-
dividual legislators. As a consequence, many of these
persistent disagreements cannot be resolved with the
existing cross-national data. Additional leverage can
be gained, however, by shifting to a lower level of
empirical aggregation, the individual politician. This
move to the individual level is desirable for a number
of reasons.
First, the dominant empirical strategy pursued in
contemporary research which is premised on quan-
titative analysis of variation among a small number of
countries is severely constrained by the small number
of observations. The number of observations in cross-
national studies is relatively low, varying from 24
in the original Boix article of 1999 to 12 in some of
the specifications presented in Cusack, Iversen, and
Soskice (2007). This small number of cases, coupled
with a high multicollinearity among competing variables
has limited our ability to assess the relative importance
of competing explanations. This constraint might also
explain why so far scholars have been unable to test all
three explanations of the adoption of proportional
representation but have tested only one or two theories
at a time. Second, an analysis that is situated at the
individual level is also preferable because some of the
central predictions of the first political hypothesis—
stressing the importance of electoral vulnerabilities—
are located at the level of the electoral district. Existing
studies that have relied on cross-national data have
measured many of the relevant variables capturing
political competition at a level of analysis that is too
aggregated and, thus, uninformative Cox (1997). Rather
than assuming that parties are the decisive level, we start
at the lowest level and use hierarchical models which
allow for parties being the decisive actor while not
presupposing it.
The difficulty and real challenge for an empirical
evaluation of competing explanations of PR adoption
using roll-call data is the development of measures
of the core explanatory variables of the economic
explanation, the level of ‘‘co-specific assets.’’ We take
up this challenge in this article and develop precise
2See Rogowski (1987) for an economically motivated alternative
explanation, of PR adoption. In this explanation it is not the skill
level but the degree to which a country is involved in in-
ternational trade.
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estimates of the ratio of skilled workers at the level of
the electoral district. This allows us to bring competing
explanations about the adoption of proportional repre-
sentation to a common empirical unit of analysis and
assess, for the first time, the relative effect of structural
economic conditions at the level of the district, electoral
competition and partisanship on individual level sup-
port for the adoption of proportional representation.
Our article examines a decisive vote taken by the
German Reichstag as a result of which Germany
adopted proportional representation.3 The German
case occupies a central position in all explanations
that have been advanced to explain the adoption of
proportional representation. Consider first its impor-
tance for political explanations of changes in electoral
institutions. The existing literature treats Germany as
the paradigmatic case that illustrates the importance
of the Social Democratic threat as the catalyzing factor
leading to a change in the position of right-wing parties
over the desirability of proportional representation.
This interpretation of the German case goes back to
the classic studies of the adoption of proportional
representation, such as Braunias (1932) or Rokkan
(1970). As Rokkan argued, in countries where hostility
and distrust among existing parties on the right was too
strong, the latter found it impossible to make common
cause against the socialist threat. As such, they preferred
proportional representation, a system that guaranteed
them the ability to compete independently (1970, 158).
This account, however, has difficulties in explaining the
diverging positions taken by different parties on the
political right over the question of electoral-reform
change. While the Catholic Zentrum and the German
Conservative Party opposed the adoption of propor-
tional representation, both the National Liberals and
the Free Liberals supported the adoption of changes in
electoral institutions. Thus, it appears that both political
explanations seem to capture important determinants
of the motivations of politicians to support changes
in electoral institutions, but so far no study has
attempted to disentangle the relative explanatory
power of these two explanations. Germany is a great
case to test hypotheses about the effect of Social
Democratic mobilization on the adoption of propor-
tional representation. Germany expanded the suffrage
early (1871); the left did not burst on the political
scene so dramatically as in other countries that adopted
the franchise much later. Moreover, the early franchise
expansion generated lower political uncertainty about
electoral outcomes, as compared to the countries in
which franchise expansion was much closer to PR
adoption (Ahmed, 2010; Andrews and Jackman 2005).4
Germany is also the case that motivates the eco-
nomic explanation of the adoption of proportional
representation. The extensive network of vocational
training (Thelen 2004) that was well-established during
the Nineteenth century led to the development of a
workforce characterized by high ratios of skilled workers
and an unusually high level of vocational skills
(Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1899, 73; Bade 1980).
The central hypothesis advanced by Cusack, Iversen,
and Soskice (2007) suggests that the regional variation
in the distribution of human capital has important
political consequences both for the adoption of pro-
portional representation and for democratization
more broadly. Germany takes high values on the
measures of economic coordination developed by
Cusack and his colleagues (2007). Our own measure
of skills—which tests the theoretical mechanism that
underpins this argument directly—shows that Ger-
many exhibited very high levels of skills in many
industrial occupations. Germany occupies, thus, an
asymmetric position for economic and political ex-
planations and represents a ‘‘hard’’ case for Rokkanian
explanations (George and Bennett 2005). Due to this
asymmetry, empirical results that disconfirm impor-
tance of human capital as a predictor of the adoption
of proportional representation in the German case can
weaken our confidence in the comparative explanatory
power of the economic approach to the origin of pro-
portional representation.
The following section explores the tensions among
the two political hypotheses concerning the determi-
nants of support of changes in electoral institutions and
formulates both the hypotheses and the empirical strat-
egy used to assess the relative importance of partisan
considerations and district-level electoral competition
on legislator support for changes in electoral institutions.
We turn next to the economic explanation, discuss its
empirical predictions, and then discuss our measures of
human capital distributions across electoral districts.
Economic Conditions, Political
Competition, and the Change of
Electoral Institutions
Stein Rokkan’s shadow looms over much of the con-
temporary research seeking to explain the adoption
3This represents the only recorded vote on the issue of pro-
portional representation taken by the German Reichstag during
the period between 1870 and 1918 (see also Hatschek 1920).
4We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this
aspect.
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of proportional representation in Europe during the
first decades of the twentieth century (Rokkan 1970).
Two of the dominant hypotheses concerning the adop-
tion of proportional representation can be traced back
to his work. The first of these argues that incumbent
elites support the adoption of proportional representa-
tion to avoid a complete electoral disaster in the face
of Social Democratic mobilization (Rokkan 1970).
Boix takes up this hypothesis and argues that if
parties on the political right are equally balanced in
their electoral strength, but unable to coordinate on
a common candidate (either at the level of the constit-
uency or nationally), then they are likely to support the
adoption of proportional representation. By contrast,
the incentives to adopt changes in electoral institutions
are weaker if one party dominates the electoral arena
Boix (1999, 612).
Rokkan’s second hypothesis—taken up in current
research by Ernesto Calvo (2009)—attempts to specify
conditions under which incumbent parties on the right
favored changes in electoral institutions even in the
absence of Social Democratic threats. This hypothesis
suggests that parties with a geographical dispersed dis-
tribution of votes also faced incentives to demand
changes in electoral institutions, as multiparty compe-
tition increased the seat-vote disproportionality of the
electoral results. According to this logic, the adoption of
proportional representation is regarded as a mechanism
to reduce the ‘‘severity of the partisan bias and of
electoral regimes to districting problems’’ (Calvo 2009,
256).5
The two Rokkanian hypotheses differ in the
relative importance placed on the Social Democratic
threat. Both hypotheses stress, however, ‘‘electoral
coordination’’ (or failure thereof) of incumbent
parties as a critical variable influencing the decision
of incumbents to support or oppose changes in elec-
toral rules and the adoption of proportional represen-
tation. Critics have noted that the notion of electoral
coordination is theoretically unclear and poorly oper-
ationalized empirically. Cusack et al. note two limi-
tations of the test of electoral coordination presented
in Boix (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007, 375).
The first is the failure to take account of the
opportunities for coordination created in electoral
systems that used runoffs. Runoffs allowed parties
on the political right that competed in the first
round to form electoral alliances in the second
round to oppose a Social Democratic candidate.
Cusack and his colleagues note some limitations of
the empirical test of the Rokkanian notion of
electoral coordination employed by Boix and argue
that the variable used by Boix, the ‘‘effective number
of parties’’ fails to distinguish between cases in which
one party on the right is dominant from cases where
parties of the right are equally sized (2007, 375). A
similar critique is presented by Blais, Dobrzynska, and
Indridason (2005) who argue that the incentives of all
parties to switch to proportional representation are
stronger in countries which require a majority rather
then just plurality of the votes to take a district.
While raising these criticisms, Cusack, Iversen,
and Soskice (2007) do not propose a superior empir-
ical solution. It is impossible to measure district-level
electoral competition with cross-national data. Using
aggregate data we cannot learn whether or not there
was coordination on the right. Clearly, runoffs could
alleviate potential coordination problems among par-
ties on the right. However, while runoffs induce some
electoral coordination during the second round, they
do not necessarily produce electoral coordination
among right-wing parties (Bertram 1964; Fairnbairn
1990; Reibel 2007). Parties on the political right have
a range of possible strategies during runoffs. These
include the formation of preelectoral coalitions which
are restricted to right-wing parties, political support
for the left–wing candidate over the right-wing oppo-
nent (in districts where a candidate on the right
encounters a candidate on the left during runoffs) or
recommendation to their voters to abstain during the
second round (and their de facto refusal to endorse
any of the remaining candidates). We provide a number
of examples in the online appendix to illustrate how
abstention recommendations contributed to the Social
Democratic victories.
Studies emphasizing the economic foundations
of proportional representation do not derive the de-
mand for the adoption of proportional representation
from partisan expectations about their electoral survival,
but from the expectations of leading economic groups
(employers and labor) about the different regulations
that might emerge under different electoral rules.
Thus, what distinguishes the trajectory of PR from
non-PR adopters is the level and depth of investment in
skills made during the early stages of industrialization.
As Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice formulate, their
hypothesis linking specific assets and proportional
representation:
Two broad alternative patterns of labor and skill
regulation in industry can be found at this critical
period in the early twentieth century. They relate to the
question of the control of skilled formation and the
5This hypothesis is sometimes alternatively labeled ‘‘minority
representation thesis’’ (Caramani 2004) or ‘‘electoral geography
thesis’’ (e.g., Norris 1997).
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content of skilled jobs. The first possible alternative,
which we find subsequently in each of the PR adopters,
was some form of cooperative agreement between
business and unions: in exchange for collective bargain-
ing rights and monitoring of skill formation, business
would have managerial control of the shop floor and
determine training levels. This alternative had major
implications for the politics of regulation because skills
in this system are co-specific assets. . . . Unions and
employers become vulnerable to opportunism and
holdup and they consequently need credible long-run
guarantees which include an appropriate framework
agreement at the political level to underwrite the
relevant labor market and social security institutions
and rules. The political system has to be such that the
agreement cannot be changed by a change of govern-
ment without the consent of other groups. This requires
not just a system of proportional representations to
enable the different groups to be represented through
parties, but also a political system that allows for
consensus decision making in the regulatory areas that
concern them. (2007, 328)
We interpret the argument as generating two testable
empirical implications. The first is that in countries
or regions where investments in specific skills are higher,
economic actors seek to establish proportional systems
of representation either independently or through their
partisan representatives. By contrast, the demand for
proportional levels of representation is lower in regions
with lower levels of co-specific assets. Secondly, regions
characterized by high levels of investment in skills also
experience more consensual relations in the industrial
sphere and among parties.
Yet, despite the straightforward nature of this
empirical implication, Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice
have not yet provided a direct empirical test of their
theory. In their cross-national analysis, the variable
used to test the importance of ‘‘co-specific assets’’ is
a composite variable that includes the strength of
employer associations and the existence of rural
cooperatives and preexisting guilds. The other indi-
cator, the strength of employer associations, is a
problematic empirical measure. As Kuo (2010) has
illustrated, most employer associations that existed
in Europe prior to World War I (and thus prior to
the adoption of proportional representation) were
established with the explicit goal to repress labor
movements. The existence of a coordinated em-
ployer association does not proxy for harmonious
labor relations and co-specific investments, the
critical variable of this theory.
The most recent American Political Science Review
article which restates the asset-specific explanation
and offers limited qualitative evidence discussing elec-
toral reforms in Imperial Germany does not provide
any direct measures of human-capital development
across German regions. Saxony, Wu¨rttemberg, and
Baden are used interchangeably as being, presumably,
cases that share similarly high endowments of human
capital (which is the hypothesized factor leading to the
adoption of proportional representation). Cusack,
Iversen, and Soskice (2007) provide no empirical
evidence to support these conjectures. At the turn of
the century, Baden and Wu¨rttemberg are relatively
underdeveloped regions of the German Empire, dis-
playing levels of agricultural employment that are
higher than the respective levels in the Reich (Hohls
and Kaelble 1989, 167–87).6 Our estimates of human-
capital development—which computes ratios of skilled
workers to total workforce—present roughly similar
patterns. The national average is 36.2% (sd5 9.0) and
while Saxony reaches 52.7% (sd 5 3.01), we find that
Baden has 36.8% (sd 5 2.8), and Wu¨rttemberg is
slightly below average with 35.8% (sd 5 1.47). These
measures do not support the argument that all three
regions (Saxony, Baden, and Wu¨rttemberg) share
high endowments in human capital (see also
Fremdling and Tilly 1979). Thus, qualitative
assessment of nineteenth-century economic reali-
ties (which are likely to be based on twentieth-
century outcomes) turn out to be inaccurate.
Given that the core explanatory variable (distribu-
tion of ‘‘asset specific investments’’) takes different
values across these regions, it cannot serve as the
common explanation for subnational electoral reforms.
While the debate between economic and political
explanations of the adoption of proportional repre-
sentation has occupied a visible place in prominent
publications, it has not yet been resolved. Quite the
contrary. This inconclusiveness has several reasons.
Existing explanations have been brought to the data
only imperfectly. Ambiguity exists as to what con-
stitutes electoral coordination and how it should be
operationalized. Many of the existing tests of the first
Rokkanian hypotheses have only assessed the effects
6At the time of the 1895 census, the share of the labor force
employed in agriculture in Baden and Wu¨rttemberg stood at 44
and 45%, respectively. The average agricultural share for the
entire Reich stood at 37%. By contrast, Saxony’s share of
agricultural employment stood at 17%. These relative levels of
economic development did not change much until 1905–1907,
the period when the last economic census prior to World War I
was assessed. The employment shares in agriculture in Baden
declined from 45 to 40% but remained relatively stable in
Wu¨rttemberg at 45%. In both regions, levels of industrial
development continued to be below that of the Empire (which
stood at 35% in 1905). By contrast, Saxony’s share of agricultural
employment stood at 13% in 1905. The figures are based on the
aggregate results of both economic censuses presented in Hohls
and Kaelble (1989, 167–208).
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of variation in national-level competitiveness on the
probability of transition to proportional representa-
tion. This remains both an imperfect test of the first
Rokkanian hypothesis which has to be tested using
more disaggregated subnational and district-level meas-
ures. The empirical assessment of economic explana-
tions is a necessary step in the evaluation of competing
explanations for the adoption of proportional represen-
tation. For this endeavor, the lack of a measure of the
core explanatory variable, the co-specific assets, is an
outstanding difficulty.
A Theoretical Reformulation of
the Rokkanian Hypotheses
The two political hypotheses locate the prime de-
terminant of legislators’ calculations about the attrac-
tiveness of different electoral rules at different levels of
analysis, the individual district versus the party. The
first hypothesis highlights electoral vulnerabilities at the
level of the district. In this hypothesis, the general
contestation of a race, the availability or absence of
coalition partners, the strength of the contender on the
left, and the potentially scarring experience of a runoff
are likely to affect the decision of a politician to support
changes in electoral institutions. By contrast, the second
political hypothesis locates the important determinant
at the level of the party and not the district. Partisan
preferences over the desirability of different electoral
rules are influenced by the attractiveness (or its absence)
of the way in which the policy status quo allocates votes
to seats. In their calculation about the relative attrac-
tiveness of different electoral rules, politicians are con-
strained both by district-specific factors and by the
general considerations of their party. The partisan and
district-level incentives can reinforce each other for
support of particular electoral rules, but they can also
come into tension. Consider the case of a politician
representing a party from the right that experiences an
unfavorable distribution of votes to seats and who has
been elected by a narrow margin in a runoff against a
Social Democratic opponent. For this particular politi-
cian, the constituency-level incentives and the partisan
incentives reinforce each other, and one expects this
politician to support the adoption of proportional
representation. Partisan and district-specific electoral
incentives may, however, come into tension.
By hypothesizing that the two political explanations
about the origin of proportional representation high-
light political incentives that are located at different
levels of analysis, we challenge a number of statements
made by Rokkan. Instead of viewing the two political
hypotheses as separate roads to proportional represen-
tation undertaken by different countries, we argue that
both logics can be at work within the same country.
The two hypotheses specify different constraints on
the behavior of legislators. To formulate this point
more starkly, there are no two roads to proportional
representations, but two distinct sets of political
constraints on the behavior of politicians, which
operate at the level of the district and party, re-
spectively. A legislator-based account of the origin of
proportional representation allows us to disentangle
the relative effects of these constraints.
District-Level Vulnerabilities versus
Partisan Constraints
To test the implications of the first Rokkanian hypoth-
esis, we examine the consequences of district-specific
factors on the probability of support of changes in
electoral institutions. We hypothesize that three
variables linked to the contestability of a race are
likely to affect the support of the legislator for
changes in electoral institutions. The first is whether
the politician is elected in the first round or a runoff.
All things equal, we hypothesize that politicians
elected in runoffs are more vulnerable than politicians
elected during the first round. Runoffs are themselves
an indicator of coordination difficulties for parties on
the right. As such, we hypothesize that politicians on the
right elected during runoffs are more likely to support
changes in electoral institutions than politicians elected
during the first round. A second district-specific factor
that is likely to affect preferences towards electoral
institutions is the margin of victory. All things equal,
politicians elected in races with larger margins are more
likely to support the policy status quo than politicians
elected in more contested races with narrower margins.
A final prediction of the first Rokkanian hypothesis
is that the magnitude of the threat of the Social
Democratic Party (as measured by the vote share of
the Social Democratic candidate during the first
round) is likely to increase support for changes in
electoral institutions.
We include three variables to test for these
hypotheses linking electoral vulnerability in the district
and preferences for changes in electoral institutions.
They include a variable that takes the value of 1 when
the politician was elected during runoffs, a measure of
the margin of victory during the decisive electoral
round and a measure of the vote share of the Social
Democratic candidate. In combination, these variables
allow us to capture only the theoretical expectations laid
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out by the first Rokkanian hypothesis. They capture
district-specific electoral constraints. They remain in-
sufficient in capturing the full set of political constraints
and considerations facing the politician. To understand
the latter, we need to consider partisan considerations
about the effects of the electoral formula on the electoral
fate of the party. We turn to a discussion of these
considerations next.
Partisan Preferences about Changes
of Electoral Rules
The second political hypothesis formulates its pre-
dictions at the level of the party rather than district.
In this hypothesis, the key variable that is likely to
affect the preferences of parties about the adoption of
proportional representation is the disproportionality
in the allocation of seats to votes under the existing
electoral rules. Parties that benefit from the current
allocation of seats to votes (by obtaining a higher seat
than vote share) are likely to favor the policy status
quo. By contrast, parties that lose from the allocation
of seats to votes are likely to favor changes in electoral
institutions and the adoption of proportional
representation.
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the
effects of disproportionality for the major political
parties during the 1912 election of the Reichstag,
which elected the deputies that ultimately adopted
the legislation introducing proportional representation.
We group existing deputies in six partisan families,
which include Social Democrats (who at the time
obtained the largest number of votes), the Zentrum,
National Liberals, Free Liberals, Conservatives, and
parties representing minorities (such as Poles or the
Elsass independents). Column 2 presents information
on the number of votes cast for these candidates,
column 3 on the number of seats held by the respective
party during the last session of the Reichstag. Column 4
presents the measure of seat-vote disproportionality for
the party and column 5 the prediction about support
for changes in electoral institutions.
As Table 1 illustrates, the Social Democratic Party
experienced the most disfavorable ratio in the allocation
of votes to seats. Industrialization which led to the con-
centration of voters in urban areas aggravated the dis-
proportionality experienced by the Social Democratic
Party (Boix 2010). The disproportionality worsened
from (22.6) in 1871 to (27.1) percent in 1912.
As a result, the Social Democratic Party became the
staunchest advocates for the introduction of pro-
portional representation. During the period leading
to World War I, Social Democratic candidates
cosponsored legislation recommending the intro-
duction of proportional representation in national
elections for the Reichstag and actively advanced
similar proposals during discussions of electoral
reforms of the subnational parliaments (Schma¨deke
1995). Several studies assume that Social Democratic
parties were supportive of the adoption of propor-
tional representation. As recent studies have pointed
out, this assumption may be inaccurate and cannot
adequately account for the observed empirical varia-
tion in the preferences of Social Democratic parties
across Europe on the question of electoral reform
(Ahmed 2012; Penade´s 2008). We can, however, derive
theoretically the preferences of Social Democrats by
taking seat-vote disproportionality into account.
Among the parties on the right, the two prom-
inent losers in the allocation of votes to seats were the
Free Liberals and National Liberals. The dispropor-
tionality index during the 1912 elections stood at
(22.5) for Free Liberals and at (22.3) for National
Liberals. In contrast to Social Democrats that had
been disfavored by the allocation of votes to seats
during all elections of the period, for the two parties
on the right the disproportionality in the allocation of
votes to seats was a more recent phenomenon that came
TABLE 1 Seat-Vote Disproportionality for the Largest Parties in the Reichstag during the 1912 Election
Party
Vote
Share
Seat
Share Disproportionality
Prediction of
Rokkan II
Social Democrats 34.8 % 27.7 % -7.1 Support of PR
Zentrum 16.8 % 22.9 % 6.1 Opposition to PR
National Liberals 13.6 % 11.3 % -2.3 Support of PR
Conservatives 11.6 % 14.1 % 2.5 Opposition to PR
Free Liberals 13.1 % 10.6 % -2.5 Support of PR
Minorities 4.5 % 8.3 % 3.8 Opposition to PR
Source: Reibel (2007) based on Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1913, 4-103) and www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de.
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into place during the last elections of the Reichstag
(Duverger 1963, 375). Party leaders from these two
parties embraced the idea of proportional representa-
tion later than the Social Democrats, and the question
about the advantage of this electoral reform remained
the subject of significant intra-party disagreement Gagel
(1958, 125–41). For Free Liberals, the push for the
adoption of proportional representation originated with
party leaders from Southern German states where the
presence of Catholic minorities in some districts could
lead to the waste of votes won by the Free Liberal
candidates under the existing single-member electoral
system (Simon 1969).
The two large political parties on the right that
benefited from the allocation of seats to votes were
the Zentrum and the Conservatives. Party leaders
from both parties understood the electoral advan-
tage of existing electoral institutions and rejected the
introduction of proposals calling for the adoption of
proportional representation (on Zentrum: Penade´s
2011; on Conservatives: Ku¨hne 1994). This opposi-
tion to any reform of the electoral system remained
one of the issues that brought these two parties—
which had been bitter enemies during the
Kulturkampf—together and led to the creation of
the ‘‘black-blue’’ electoral alliance during the 1912
election (Bertram 1964; Reibel 2007).
An internal report commissioned by the German
Interior Ministry (Reichsamt des Innern) in the im-
mediate aftermath of the 1912 election noted the
divergent rates of success of different parties of the
right in translating their votes into seats. The report
observed that while the ‘‘Liberal Party obtained over
3 million votes in 1912, it was able to obtain only 4
seats in the first round, while the Zentrum obtained
over 80 seats with only 2 million votes. ‘‘The explana-
tion for this fact is’’, the report noted, ‘‘that there are
no areas where there are only Liberals; rather there are
areas where there are Liberals and either Conservatives,
or Zentrum or Social Democrats’’ (Bundesarchiv Berlin
Lichterfeld R1501/192–193). Prominent liberal
politicians also noted the worsening seat-vote
disproportionality encountered by their party
and began to advocate the adoption of propor-
tional representation (Brandenburg 1917, 30; Gagel
1958, 128).
Social Democrats had militated for changes in
electoral institutions beginning with the 1891 Erfurt
congress. By contrast, Free Liberal and National Liberal
politicians began to advocate the adoption of propor-
tional representation only much later (Gagel 1958). This
shift in the position on the desirability of electoral
reform advocated by these two parties on the right
guaranteed the formation of an encompassing political
coalition supporting the adoption of proportional
representation. The political factor that motivated this
change in strategy among these two parties on the right
was the worsening of their seat-vote disproportionalities.
Let us consider how considerations about the
translation of votes to seats affected the policy posi-
tions of a range of parties on the question of electoral
reform. From the perspective of the Social Democratic
Party, calculations of their expected vote share under
this alternative electoral rule (that used as input the
number of votes received during the 1907 election)
revealed an expected gain of 76 seats (from 43 to 117
seats; Andersen 2000, 343; Fricke 1961). Both National
Liberal and Free Liberal Parties that experienced losses
in the translation of votes to seats under the existing
electoral rules also favored the adoption of propor-
tional representation (Andersen 2000, 343; Gagel 1958,
143). By contrast, the two other parties on the right
that gained from the allocation of the votes to seats
under single member electoral rules—the conserva-
tives and the Zentrum—opposed changes in electoral
rules. A recommendation of the Ministry of Interior
summarizes the fear of Conservatives about changes
in electoral rules. The adoption of proportional
representation, this study showed, would reduce
the seat share of conservative parties by eight seats
(as compared to the 1912 results) and ‘‘cannot be
regarded as a cure against the existing inequalities in
representation’’. The expected loss of seats for the
Zentrum, as compared to its 1912 electoral results,
stood at 32 seats (Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfeld
R1501/343).
We have begun to explore the implication of the
second Rokkanian logic for the preferences on reform
of electoral institutions. Parties losing from the allo-
cation of votes to seats (Social Democrats, National
Liberals, and Free Liberals) supported the introduction
of proportional representation. By contrast, winners
of vote seat disproportionality (Conservatives and
Zentrum) opposed it. How constraining were these
desiderata of party leaders on the decisions made by
individual legislators during the actual vote of electoral
reforms? Our empirical analysis allows us to explore
these questions and examine whether individual legis-
lators internalized these needs of their respective
parties and of the relative effect of district specific
vulnerabilities in affecting their calculations. To test
how the disproportionality in the allocation of votes
to seats affects the preferences of party leaders, we
include the measure of disproportionality (SEAT
VOTE DISPR.) as additional control in our analysis
of the vote choice of legislators.
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Asset Specific Investments and the
Adoption of Proportional Representation
Both Rokkanian explanations are political explana-
tions. They locate the source of demand for changes in
electoral institutions in either electoral vulnerabilities
at the district or in partisan calculations. The causal
chain presupposed by these hypotheses is relatively
short: politicians, it is hypothesized, respond either to
their increased electoral vulnerability or to calculations
about the translation of votes into seats. By contrast,
economic explanations locate the source of political
demand for electoral change in economic conditions
at the local level or the regional level. The causal chain
linking these economic factors the actions of legislators
is long and tenuous. In this alternative explanation,
politicians favor the adoption of proportional repre-
sentation not because it serves an immediate political
need but because they expect that proportional repre-
sentation will produce more favorable labor regulation
that will protect the ‘‘asset specific investments’’ made
by employers and firms in their districts (Cusack,
Iversen, and Soskice 2007, 2010). Let us suspend
possible questions about the farsightedness of politi-
cians and assume that this logic captures plausible
political constraint on the activity of legislators (e.g.,
Andrews and Jackman 2005). The empirical question
that we seek to answer is whether structural conditions
at the district level affect the political choices made by
legislators once we control for all the other relevant
political factors (Rokkan 1 and Rokkan 2) that pre-
suppose a much shorter causal chain. As the argument
rests on local economies that differ in their levels of
co-specific investments and where politicians respond
to the political demands of firms and workers that
have made these specific investments in skills. As such,
the district level—a level where individual politicians
come into direct contact with these economic actors—is
an essential level of analysis at which the argument can
be tested. However, given that this theoretical contri-
bution is vague about the specific level at which this
mechanism applies, we also investigate empirically
whether the mechanism operates at the level of the
region or at the level of the party.
Above, we have noted that non-Rokkanian
approaches have not yet tested the core element of
their explanation—which hypothesizes that support
for proportional representation can be predicted by
high levels of ‘‘asset specific’’ investment. We seek to
remedy these shortcomings and replace the imprecise
characterizations of variation in ‘‘co-specific assets’’
with actual measures of human-capital development
across German electoral districts, regions, and parties.
While difficult and computationally intensive, it is
possible to compute measures of the distribution of
human capital across German regions prior to the
adoption of proportional representation.
We use two distinct sources of the German
occupational census to compute this measure. First,
we start with tables of the ratio between skilled and
unskilled workers. As part of its 1895 census, the
German Statistical Agency has collected information
on the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers
in 183 occupations, which includes 161 industrial
occupations and 22 occupations in services. The
definition of skilled workers (‘‘gelernte Arbeiter’’)
employed by the Statistical Agency is straightforward
(but somewhat laconic): ‘‘skilled workers (gelernte
Arbeiter) are those workers that require some training.
By contrast, unskilled workers (ungelernte Arbeiter)—in
other words manual workers, handymen, and other
workers in services—which do not have ‘‘existing
training’’ (Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1899, 73).
The study noted that the number of skilled workers
is very high in Germany (nearly 50% of workers
employed in industry). ‘‘The economic relations in
industry—which requires particular abilities and
skills which can be learned or acquired through
persistent exercise are the decisive factor which
explain these high ratios of skills’’ (Kaiserliches
Statistisches Amt 1893, 73). We present the disag-
gregated levels of skills for all 161 occupations in the
online appendix (Table A8; further information is in
Section A2 of the online appendix).
Our second input is Germany’s occupational
census. In addition to the information on skill
profiles of occupation, the 1895 occupational census
(Gewerbeza¨hlung) contains extremely disaggregated
information on the employment shares across these
180 occupations in 1,003 German localities.7 These
two sources allow us to estimate the ratio of skilled
to unskilled industrial workers across each locality.
In a final stage, we aggregate localities at the district
level to obtain measures of the density of human
capital across the 397 electoral districts of Imperial
Germany. Using the number of skilled workers in
each district as an input, we compute two measures
of skill profiles that differ in their respective denom-
inator. The first is a measure of skills as a percentage of
7The occupational census—which is the main source for the
construction of our skill variable—presents the information at
a very disaggregated level of analysis, the commune. To aggregate
information from over 1000 communes to the level of the
electoral districts, we rely on Reibel (2007), who presents detailed
information of the boundaries of the 397 electoral districts.
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workers employed in industry (SKILL). The second is
a ratio of skilled workers to all employed persons in
the district (SKILL LEVEL). Finally, we also use a
measure of skills aggregated at a higher level which
corresponds to the 29 subnational political units
(SKILL REGION).8 We present the results using the
second and third measure of skills in the online
appendix of the article (Table 1, Table 2, Table 3,
and Table 4).
Empirical Analysis: Explaining
Support for the Adoption of PR
The dependent variable in our analysis is the support
for a bill recommending the adoption of proportional
representation and ‘‘the creation of larger electoral
districts’’ (Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen
Reichstages 13). The bill was approved by a rather
narrow political margin of 10% points, with 55%
of deputies voting in favor, 45% deputies opposing
it, and three casting invalid ballots. The vote in
the Reichstag represents the endpoint of an intense
(but relatively short) period of parliamentary negotia-
tions of changes in electoral institutions for elections
to the second chamber of the national parliament.
We conducted an extensive search of all legislative
bills recommending the introduction of propor-
tional representation throughout the 13 legislative
sessions of the Reichstag between 1870 and 1912,
but we only found legislative initiatives recom-
mending the adoption of proportional represen-
tation during the 13th Reichstag that was elected
in 1912.
Empirical Evidence for Motivations
to Change Electoral Systems
We attempt to solve the puzzle presented by the
existing literature on the origin of proportional
representation; competing explanations of this political
choice differ widely in their postulated causal mecha-
nisms. Our test is decisive in adjudicating among these
competing explanations for a number of reasons.
First, it has the crucial advantage that it is carried
out at the lowest possible level of analysis, the indi-
vidual level, and subsequently we can aggregate and
move further up. This allows us not to presuppose
a level but to actually test which level can contribute
to the explanation. Since the decision to change an
electoral system is made by a politician representing
a district, we should be relying on district-specific
measures; we can use the margin of victory in a district
instead of relying on a country wide average to gauge
the closeness of vote outcomes. Secondly, it allows us to
test for a range of additional factors—most notably the
partisan concerns about disproportionality—that have
not yet been incorporated into a economic models
explaining electoral system change. Finally, our meas-
ures of the theoretical concepts invoked by various
explanations (such as asset specific investments) are,
we believe, more precise than the existing indicators
of coordination used in cross-national research.9
The latter measures are both quite distant from the core
variables that are hypothesized to affect the outcomes
(‘‘skills’’) and also susceptible to measurement error
(Kreuzer 2010).
We carry out a full test that includes the salient
variables in each of the main hypotheses in the lit-
erature, including the second Rokkanian hypothesis.
We use predictors originating from all three political
explanations: district specific vulnerabilities and socialist
threat (Rokkan I), seat-vote disproportionalities
(Rokkan II), and levels of skills acquired through
the vocational training system Cusack, Iversen, and
Soskice (2010). This is not only the first test that
includes all the variables but also the first time that
these hypotheses are tested at the district level, the
regional level, and the partisan level.
The models presented in Table 2 operationalize all
three hypotheses. Our test of the second Rokkanian
hypothesis is the degree of disproportionality in the
translation of votes to seats. We use the dataset on
electoral politics in Imperial Germany (1871 to
1912) which we cross-check with Reibel (2007) to
determine the partisanship of the winning politician in
each district.
The measure of disproportionality (SEAT VOTE
DISPR.) takes higher values if the share of seats held
8The online appendix presents yet another operationalization
which is based on parties. We compute the average value of
district skill levels over all districts a party holds (see the online
appendix for more details).
9The variable used by Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007) to test
the importance of ‘‘co-specific assets’’ is a composite variable that
includes the strength of employer associations and the existence
of rural cooperatives and preexisting guilds. The other indicator,
the strength of employer associations, is a problematic empirical
measure. As Kuo (2010) has illustrated, most employer associa-
tions that existed in Europe prior to World War I (and thus prior
to the adoption of proportional representation) were established
with the explicit goal to repress labor movements. The existence
of a coordinated employer association does not proxy for
harmonious labor relations and co-specific investments, the
critical variable of this theory.
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TABLE 2 Regular Probit and Hierarchical Probit Models on PR Vote
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Partisan
SEAT VOTE DISPR. -0.301***
(0.037)
-0.391***
(0.056)
-0.406***
(0.058)
-0.414***
(0.061)
-0.317***
(0.102)
-0.362***
(0.112)
-0.381***
(0.107)
-0.393***
(0.106)
District
SOCIALVOTE 0.026**
(0.011)
0.026**
(0.013)
0.111**
(0.044)
0.100**
(0.047)
0.033***
(0.013)
0.035**
(0.015)
0.087*
(0.048)
0.088*
(0.053)
SECOND*SOC.VOTE -0.095**
(0.039)
-0.093**
(0.043)
-0.072
(0.045)
-0.079
(0.049)
RIGHT MARGIN*SOC.VOTE -0.507
(0.469)
1.149
(0.822)
1.197
(0.862)
-0.965
(0.616)
0.475
(1.001)
0.724
(1.048)
RIGHT MARGIN 0.008
(0.005)
0.005
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.009)
SECOND 0.025**
(0.012)
0.024*
(0.013)
0.027*
(0.015)
0.021
(0.013)
0.020
(0.013)
0.021
(0.016)
Economic
SKILL -3.719
(3.244)
-2.773
(3.596)
-2.487
(3.680)
-3.803
(4.328)
-2.965
(3.780)
-2.774
(4.338)
-2.351
(4.403)
-2.643
(5.040)
Control
CATHOLICS -0.003
(0.009)
0.015
(0.015)
0.021
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.006
(0.017)
0.016
(0.018)
NON AGRICULTURAL -0.001
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
CONSTANT 1.769
(1.954)
-0.079
(2.348)
-1.367
(2.523)
0.983
(2.943)
1.001
(2.299)
0.306
(2.920)
-0.609
(3.026)
0.978
(3.366)
ln s2j
 
0.007
(0.856)
0.089
(0.851)
-0.070
(0.870)
-0.169
(0.930)
Regional fixed effects 3 3 3 O 3 3 3 O
Corretly predicted cases 95.07% 94.72% 94.72% 96.48% 95.07% 95.07% 95.07% 96.13%
N 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284
Bayesian information criterion 143.706 157.356 162.232 176.313 128.995 146.127 153.951 172.358
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; baseline 55.28%. *p , 0.10; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.01.
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by each party is higher than its share of votes. Thus, a
positive number reflects a party that gains from the
existing electoral arrangement. Negative numbers
indicate parties whose fortunes might improve under
proportional representation (see Table 1). We use three
variables to test for the effects of the district-specific
uncertainties postulated by the first Rokkanian
hypothesis on the decision of legislators to support
proportional representation: a measure of the
strength of the Social Democratic party in a district
(SOCIALVOTE), a measure of the decisive electoral
round which takes the value of 1 if the politician is
elected during the second round (SECOND) and
a measure of the closeness of the race among
nonsocialist parties in the first round (RIGHT
MARGIN).10
Three additional explanatory variables model
differences in economic and social conditions
across districts. We use our skill measure (SKILL)
to account for the consequences of different ‘‘invest-
ments in co-specific assets,’’ the critical explanatory
variable proposed by Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice
(2007). Our measure of differences in economic
development is a variable that captures the share of
the labor force that is not employed in agriculture
(NON AGRICULTURE). We also measure the share
of Catholics (CATHOLICS) in a district to account
for the possible effects of religious heterogeneity.
This measure is consistent with cross-national
analyses of the effects of religious fragmentation with
the probability of adoption of proportional represen-
tation (Boix 1999).
We first estimate four different model specifica-
tions. In all models the outcome is whether a member
of the Reichstag voted yes or no on the proposal to
introduce proportional representation. All four mod-
els are presented in Table 2. The first specification,
Model 1, is a probit model which includes variables
relating to the three theoretically interesting concepts;
the seat-vote disproportionality, the strength of
left parties, and the average skill level in a district.
The second specification, Model 2, adds a number
of controls for the tightness of the election in a
district (RIGHT MARGIN, SECOND) as well as the
controls (CATHOLICS11, NON AGRICULTURAL).
The third model also includes two interactions, one
between SOCIALVOTE and SECOND and one be-
tween RIGHT MARGIN and SOCIALVOTE. These
interactions reflect the theoretical argument; when
politicians are elected in a second round, their district
is already competitive. Hence the strength of the left
parties or the right margin should add less to their
propensity to support Proportional Representation
than if they were elected in the first round. Finally,
in Model 4, we also include regional fixed effects as an
illustration of the robustness of the results.
As hypothesized, we find a negative effect for
seat-vote disproportionality across all specifications.
The more disadvantageous the seat-vote ratio under
majoritarian elections is for a party, the more likely
it will be that its members support a change to pro-
portional representation (Rokkan II). An increase in
the strength of the left parties in a district increases
the likelihood that the politicians will support a
change in electoral rules (Rokkan I). Finally, there
is no effect for the average skill level in a district on the
willingness of the representative to support changes in
electoral institutions. A comparison of the estimates
fromModel 2 (without interactions) and Model 3 (with
interactions) shows how the size of the coefficient for
SOCIALVOTE more than triples while the interaction
(with SECOND) is negative and significant. The expla-
nation for the increase in the size of the coefficient for
SOCIALVOTE is that we now allow the model to have
two different effects for SOCIALVOTE: one for politi-
cians elected in the first round and one for those
politicians elected in the second round. The left threat
exerts an effect for politicians which were elected in
the first round while those representatives which
had to face a run-off are already in competitive
districts, and the left threat should affect them less.
The change of b^SOCIALVOTE from Model 2 to Model 3
10Capturing the potential for coordination with the measure
of RIGHT MARGIN, rather than using effective number of
right parties, is also in line with more recent research which
finds that alliances are more likely when there is a clear strong
party and a clearly weaker one (e.g., Blais and Indridason
2007).
11Rokkan’s second hypothesis comes in fact in two different
specifications. The first of these specifications suggests that one
of the motivations for the adoption of proportional representation
is the protection of the minorities. The second explanation
suggests that the geographic efficiency of votes is the main
determinant of the preferences of parties (Calvo 2009). To test
for the first hypothesis, we include a measure of the share of
Catholics in a district. One expects that politicians from districts
with a higher percentage of Catholic voters should support the
adoption of proportional representation. We find no support for
this hypothesis. Moreover, our analysis suggests that the interpre-
tation of the second Rokkanian hypothesis as one about seat-vote
disproportionality is the appropriate one in this case. The Zentrum,
the party representing Catholic voters did, in fact, oppose the
adoption of proportional representation. Zentrum politicians won
from the seat-vote disproportionality of the electoral system and
had thus reasons to oppose changes in electoral rules.
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is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the
first Rokkanian hypothesis. Finally, adding fixed
effects does not change the estimates in any mean-
ingful way with the exception that the interaction
between RIGHT MARGIN and SOCIALVOTE
achieves statistical significance.12
To fully illustrate these effects, we present a figure
with predicted probabilities to clarify the interaction
effects (see Figure 1). We plot the predicted proba-
bilities for two hypothetical cases where the only
difference is that one legislator was elected in the
first round and the other was elected in a run-off.
Simulation results rest on estimates from Model 3
and the predicted probabilities are displayed with 6
one standard deviation. The marginal effect of the
strength of the SPD in a district has a positive and
significant effect. In addition, the magnitude of effect
is stronger in those districts which did not require a
runoff election.
Finally, we turn our attention to the economic
predictors. In all specifications, we find that the average
skill ratio of a district has no significant influence on the
probability of a legislator voting ‘‘yes’’ on the adoption
of proportional representation. But we do find an effect
for economic modernization (NON AGRICULTURE),
but this effect is not robust and disappears in alternative
model specifications. The nonfinding for SKILL does
not depend on the inclusion of NON AGRICULTURE;
all models support the null hypothesis that there is no
relation between the probability of a ‘‘yes’’ vote and the
average skill level.13
In addition to these results, we perform a number
of robustness checks and present all the estimation
results in the online appendix. We present the same
models but use two alternative measures of skilled
labor force—skill level of total work force as well as
a measure of skill that is aggregated over regions.
The results are presented in Table 1 and Table 3 in the
online appendix. Among these alternative models pre-
sented in the appendix, we also estimate a model that
examines the vote choice of nonsocialist representa-
tives in the Reichstag only and excludes the Social
Democratic candidates. The results reinforce our
confidence in the explanatory value of the electoral
threat of the left on the political support for changes
in electoral rules (see Table 7 in the online appendix).
Finally, we also reestimate alternative models where
we include a measure of population size to control
for possible effects of malapportionment (Table 5 in
the online appendix). In all specifications the results
remain stable; the seat-vote disproportionality has a
significant and negative effect on support for pro-
portional representation, the strength of the left vote
in a district has a positive and significant effect, and
there is no statistical relation between skill levels and
voting behavior.
The two Rokkanian arguments do not apply to
the same level of analysis. The left threat is a district
level variable whereas the seat-vote disproportionality
is a party-level variable. To take these different levels
fully into account empirically, we reestimate Models 1
FIGURE 1 Support of Proportional Adoption
12A x2 test whether SECOND and SECOND*SOC.VOTE are
significant predictors or not yields a test statistic of x22 ¼ 13:28
and a p–value of 0.001 based on Model 3 (for Model 4:
x22 ¼ 10:24 and a p–value of 0.005).
13In an estimation of Model 4 that excludes NON AGRICULTURE,
we find b^SKILL ¼ 4:5 and a p–value of 0.289.
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through 4 including respecifications that take the
hierarchical data structure into account (Gelman and
Hill 2007; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Table 2 presents
the estimation results for Models 5 through 8 which are
hierarchical probit models, where the first level is the
district level and the second level is the partisan level.
Again, the outcome variable in both models is the
vote of a single member of parliament. The specifi-
cation is identical to the models in Table 2 with the
exception that we model the seat-vote disproportion-
ality (SEAT VOTE DISPR) as a level two variable and
include a random effect which varies over parties.14
The substantive effects and statistical significance of the
three most important variables that model the three
competing explanations about the adoption of propor-
tional representation (seat-vote disproportionality, skill
level, and left strength) remain unchanged when com-
pared to previous specifications presented in Table 2.
Moreover, the effects of these variables do not
change across all models presented in Table 2. In these
specifications, the measure of economic development
(NON AGRICULTURAL) no longer reaches statistical
significance at conventional levels, when compared
to Models 1–4. The coefficients of the interaction
between the second round and the Social Democratic
vote and the right margin and the Social Democratic
vote also do not reach statistical significance. These
changes notwithstanding, we find that the tests of the
relevant theoretical hypotheses remain unchanged.
The skill level in a district has no effect on the prob-
ability that a legislator in the Reichstag will support a
change of the electoral system. By contrast, political
variables exercise a considerable effect. Increases in
seat-vote disproportionality and the strength of the
left-wing candidate competing in a district increase the
probability of support for proportional representation.
Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities for sup-
port of changes in the electoral system. The light grey
curve presents changes in the probability of support
for proportional representation of a legislator repre-
senting the National Liberal party for different levels
of electoral strength of the Social Democratic challenger
(left threat). The dark grey curve represents similar
probabilities for members of the Zentrum.
National Liberal legislators are more likely to
support a change in the electoral system even if there
is no left threat at all. This can be explained by the
unfavorable allocation of seats to votes experienced
by this party during the 1912 election. By contrast,
a hypothetical legislator representing the Zentrum
found the existing electoral rules more attractive.
The Zentrum, a party with strong regional strong-
holds in Bavaria, Baden, and the Ruhr benefited
from allocation of votes to seats under the existing
electoral rules throughout the Imperial Period.
During the 1912 elections, the Zentrum ended up
receiving a surplus in the allocation of seats of
(16.1%-points). Despite these differences across parties,
the plot reveals that an increase in the left-wing threat
increased the probability of support of changes in
electoral rules for both the National Liberal and the
Zentrum representatives.
One might object to the operationalization of
skill level as a district variable and claim that the skill
mechanism rather works through the party. In that
logic, the individual representative might be respon-
sive even if his own district is not endowed with a
high skill level but rather most other members of his
party have districts with above-average skill levels.
We also provide estimation results for that opera-
tionalization where we first aggregate average skill
level for each party separately to the party level
(average of skill level for all districts held by a party)
and add this variable as a party-level variable to
the hierarchical model. The results are substantively
identical to the models presented in Table 2. There is
a negative and significant effect for seat-vote dispro-
portionality, a positive and significant effect for the
strength of the left in a district, and no relationship
between the skill level and the propensity to support
proportional representation (see Table 6 in the online
appendix).15
Party Defection and Left Threat
The two political variables that impinge upon the
political decisions of legislators—the left threat in
individual districts versus party interests—reinforce
each other on some occasions, but can, on other occa-
sions, pull in different directions. In this section, we
examine those cases where legislators defected from their
party position and voted against the party’s interest.
Can such defections be explained by individual-district
motivations?
To illustrate how district-level and partisan consid-
eration can come into conflict with each other, consider14Subscript i describes legislators and subscript j pertains to parties:
Pr(Voteij 5 1) 5 F(b0j 1 bXij); b0j 5 a0 1 a1  SVDj 1 uj; and
uj; N(0, su). The first equation describes the level 1 model where
Xij denotes the matrix of the explanatory variables and b is a vector
of regression coefficients with the same number of elements as
there are explanatory variables.
15We also estimated a model in which we let the coefficients vary
over parties and uncover the same estimates with respect to
significance level and direction of effect.
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the case of politicians from the two parties opposing the
adoption of proportional representations—Zentrum
and Conservatives—who face a strong Social
Democratic threat in their district. In this case,
partisan considerations pull the politician towards
support for existing electoral rules, while district-level
calculations pull in the direction of changes in
electoral systems. The defection of these politicians
from the position advocated by their party can be
explained by district-level competition. This is the
case, for example, of Eugen Schatz—a Zentrum poli-
tician from Saargemu¨nd-Forbach who supported the
adoption of proportional representation. Schatz had
won his seat with a narrow margin against a Social
Democratic opponent. Albert Thumann, a politician
from Gebweiler and another Zentrum politician who
defected from the position of his party—had also
clinched victory narrowly (with a majority of 55% of
the votes) against a Social Democratic challenger.
In Table 3, we present an array of five different
models explaining defection from the party line for
the Catholics (Zentrum) and the Conservatives. As
FIGURE 2 Seat-Vote Disproportionality
TABLE 3 Logit Models on Party Defection
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
SOCIALVOTE 0.092**
(0.040)
0.118**
(0.052)
0.110**
(0.052)
SKILL -18.703
(12.452)
-15.080
(13.562)
-12.926
(15.403)
RIGHT MARGIN 0.006
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.027)
0.012
(0.028)
NON AGRICULTURAL 0.002
(0.032)
0.018
(0.030)
-0.009
(0.036)
CATHOLICS -0.058
(0.043)
-0.025
(0.044)
-0.067
(0.045)
SECOND -3.116
(1.976)
-2.121
(1.769)
-2.747
(1.980)
CONSERVATIVE -2.911*
(1.599)
-1.840
(1.482)
-5.336
(3.549)
-2.759
(3.454)
-5.983
(3.922)
Constant -3.754***
(0.883)
8.769
(7.251)
0.554
(3.522)
8.811
(10.099)
9.473
(11.487)
N 108 108 108 108 108
Bayesian information criterion 43.789 57.927 37.577 52.378 46.577
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; – Logit model with penalized maximum-likelihood function, ‘‘firthlogit’’ Firth (1993).
*p , 0.10; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.01.
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hypothesized, the strength of the vote of the Social
Democratic candidate in a district (SOCIALVOTE)
can explain party defection. All specifications include
the alternative explanatory variable proposed by
Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007, 2010) which is
the district skill level (SKILL) as well as the control
variables from Models 1–8. We also add a dichoto-
mous indicator for Conservatives to allow for party
differences. In the online appendix, we present the
same models estimated only on members of Zentrum
as well as with an alternative underlying model
(see Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10). Since the variable
(SECOND) causes perfect separation (it perfectly pre-
dicts the outcome), we use a logit model based on a
penalized maximum-likelihood function to overcome
this problem (Firth 1993) which is similar to a Bayesian
estimation of the model.
Regardless which model specification, all results
in Models 9 through 13 (and the alternative specifi-
cations in the appendix) support the first Rokkanian
hypothesis that legislators facing a strong raising left
support proportional representation. Those members
of Zentrum and the Conservatives who defected from
the party line were facing considerably stronger left
candidates in their districts.
Those members of Zentrum who voted against
their party line faced significantly stronger left con-
tenders in their districts. This illustrates the strength
of Rokkan’s two hypotheses when they are allowed to
jointly explain the same observations on the party
level as well as the individual district level. We have
now not only established that the two Rokkanian
hypotheses can explain the overall vote outcome and
the adoption of PR, but we also illustrated that
Rokkan I (Social Democratic vote share as threat)
explains party defection among those parties that share
an electoral advantage from using SMD and thereby
shows that these two explanations are not two differ-
ent roads leading to PR but arguments which apply
simultaneously at different levels of analysis within the
same case.
Conclusion
We have started this article by noting a paradoxical
situation in the recent literature examining the origin
of proportional representation. The flurry of articles
in prominent publications notwithstanding, one was
left wondering which of explanations does a better
job in accounting for the choice of electoral rules
in European countries during the first decades of the
twentieth century. The current debate has been framed
as a horse-race between the first Rokkanian hypothesis
and the economic arguments formulated by Cusack,
Iversen, and Soskice (2007), to the neglect of alternative
explanations (which are also Rokkanian in origin) that
attribute an important role to partisan calculations (an
exception is Calvo 2009).
In this article, we have argued that political
demand for the adoption of proportional represen-
tation can be attributed to factors that operate at two
distinct levels. One set of considerations operate at
the level of the party. Disproportionalities in the trans-
lation of votes to seats and perceptions of possible gains
in the allocation of seats under the new electoral rules
affect partisan considerations about the desirability of
changes in electoral rules. These factors explain variation
in positions among parties on the right and the position
of Social Democratic parties on the issue of electoral
reforms. A second set of factors that impinge upon the
decisions of politicians operate at the level of the
electoral district. Here vulnerability to electoral compe-
tition from left-wing candidates can explain some
additional variation in political support for changes
in electoral rules among candidates on the political
right and the willingness of the latter to support or
deviate from the position advocated by their parties.
While these political hypotheses go back to the work of
Rokkan, we reformulate and clarify the Rokkanian
conjectures. We argue that it is more useful to think
about the two political hypotheses about the adoption
of proportional representation as identifying com-
plementary constraints on politicians, rather than
as ‘‘separate paths’’ chosen by different countries.
Empirically, we demonstrate that both logics are at
work within the same case and that they identify
different sources of demand for changes in electoral
rules.
Our article also proposes a new empirical strategy
to examine the question of changes in electoral rules
that departs from a reliance on a cross-national anal-
ysis. We propose to change the unit of analysis from
countries to individual legislators and bring back
individual politicians to the center of the analysis.
This empirical strategy has several advantages over
cross-national research. The first is that it allows
us to test existing explanations at the salient level,
the level of the district, rather than the level of
the country. Secondly, it allows to consider all
the relevant political and economic hypotheses
and not just a subset of the latter. Finally, we
improve upon existing studies by developing more
precise measures of the salient political and
economic variables.
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We find that political support for the adoption of
proportional representation was affected by partisan
considerations about the disproportionality in the trans-
lation of seats to votes and by political conditions in
a district. We do not find that legislative support can
be explained by skill levels regardless of the many
alternative specifications we employ. Our empirical
analysis disconfirms the economic hypothesis about
the adoption of proportional representation. But given
that Germany is a ‘‘hard case’’ for Rokkanian explan-
ations, we believe that our findings weaken significantly
our confidence in the comparative explanatory power of
economic hypotheses for the adoption of proportional
representation. Our findings also qualify the Rokkanian
hypothesis about the importance of the Social
Democratic threat as a determinant of the adop-
tion of proportional representation in Germany.
We show that political choices made by German leg-
islators over the adoption of proportional represen-
tation can be explained by a combination of partisan
dissatisfaction and district-level vulnerabilities. Contra
Rokkan, we show that choices over electoral rules are
affected by a combination of partisan and electoral
considerations and not by district-level vulnerabilities
to the Social Democratic threat only.
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